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1. Summary  
This rapid literature review collates evidence from academic and grey literature on support on 
inclusive peace processes. The review identified limited evidence based on robust evaluations, 
there is, however, a wide range of reviews (principally case studies) of peace processes and 
national dialogues that have been collected and collated to distil lessons on what works and why. 
These have predominantly been collated by organisations such as the Inclusive Peace and 
Transitions Initiative, Conciliation Resources and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.  
Lesson learning has played an important role in advancing the way peace processes are 
designed, negotiated and implemented. Although no two conflicts are alike, there are a number 
of lessons and practices that authors suggest can be transferred from one context to another. 
Commentators highlight that when doing so it is important to understand the differences and 
similarities between conflicts and peace processes in order to draw pertinent lessons from those 
with similar dynamics. 
A recurring theme in the literature is the belief that after periods of conflict, the design, 
negotiation and implementation of inclusive peace processes is a means of strengthening a 
society's ability to avoid a relapse into armed violence. Central to this is the need for peace 
processes to be inclusive, this refers to both the inclusion of the main parties to the conflict, but 
also the inclusion of groups that have historically been excluded from peace processes e.g. civil 
society or women, etc. Key messages identified include: 
1. Quality not just quantity is important: When included actors were able to influence the 
quality of agreements, and/or the implementation of these issues, the rate of peace 
agreements being reached and implemented was higher.  
2. Broader inclusion is important: Contrary to assumptions made by many mediators, 
broader inclusion is not thought to reduce the likelihood of reaching agreements. This is 
often associated with conflict parties and mediators pushing for broader inclusion to gain 
legitimacy and public buy-in.  
3. It is important to consider the modalities of inclusion: Inclusion takes place through 
different modalities at the table but also prior to and in parallel to official negotiations, and 
during implementation.  
4. Implementation is key: Attention of the international community goes into the 
negotiation phase. However, many processes fail or gains of inclusive negotiations are 
lost during implementation. Inclusive post-agreement commissions such as monitoring 
bodies and constitution review commissions shape implementation of agreements, thus 
their inclusive composition and proper functioning needs preparation and monitoring. 
5. Process design is important: How peace processes are designed is fundamental as it 
enables or constrains the ability of included actors to exercise influence. Whatever the 
inclusion modality, rules and procedures can negate the benefits of inclusion.  
6. Power matters: Inclusive processes can challenge power structures, and resistance by 
powerful elites is to be expected. However, local civil society groups and the international 
community have been ill prepared to handle elite resistance. Public buy-in for an 
agreement or constitution is also important and is influenced by the country’s political 
3 
climate and the attitude of powerful actors. However, public buy-in can also be 
encouraged. 
2. Inclusive Peace Processes  
The UN/World Bank (2018) report, Pathways for Peace, asserted that addressing ‘inequalities 
and exclusion’ and ‘making institutions more inclusive’ is key to preventing violent conflict. In 
turn, Conciliation Resources (2019) comment that inclusion matters as it is a mechanism to avoid 
the views and needs of elites drowning out those of the wider population. After periods of conflict, 
the design and implementation of peace processes is viewed as a means of strengthening a 
society's ability to avoid a relapse into armed violence. Indeed, a recurrent theme in the literature 
that discusses peace processes is the need for inclusion and engagement, this refers to both the 
inclusion of the main parties to the conflict, but also the inclusion of groups that have historically 
been excluded from peace processes e.g. civil society or women etc. (Dixon, 2015; Maney et al., 
2006; Wallensteen & Svensson, 2014). In the context of this report, inclusivity refers to both the 
inclusion of a diverse range of combatants but also a range of stakeholders e.g. civil society 
groups in the negotiation, agreement and implementation of peace processes.  
Ensuring the inclusivity of peace processes can be challenging. A central challenge is often 
related to the acceptance of various stakeholders’ e.g. militant nationalists, however, through 
empowering participants and increasing certainty, peace processes can be strengthened (Maney 
et al., 2006). Inclusionary processes will often involve exogenous actors offering guarantees to 
ensure all actors are accepted.  
When designing and implementing inclusive peace processes, actors must also take into account 
an array of enabling factors that need to be in place to facilitate inclusion. The example of 
Colombia, demonstrates that including combatants is not always enough and in certain contexts 
protection may also need to be offered. Negotiations in Colombia in 1982 failed for a number of 
reasons, a significant one being that whilst the government provided amnesty to ex-combatants 
they could not offer security to demobilised Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC) members who formed the political wing and around 3,000 were assassinated by 
paramilitaries (Theidon, 2009; UCL Institute of the Americas, 2012). Social and political factors 
can thus either facilitate or undermine inclusive peace processes.  
Alongside political and social factors, the design of peace processes will shape the level of 
representativeness and the distribution of power. Design or process factors also influence the 
likelihood of reaching sustainable agreements (Paffenholz et al., 2017). Key process factors 
include: the degree of inclusion and participation; representation and selection criteria; objective 
and scope-setting; institutional framework and support structures; role of authority figures; 
decision-making procedures; confidence-building measures; and provision for implementation. 
Finally it may also be important to consider who is included and why. Indeed, having negotiations 
with minor players can be counterproductive as they may lack the authority to negotiate. 
Commentators such as Fisas (2015) suggest that it is therefore necessary to start by using an 
inclusive approach that gives a voice to actors whom the other party may not want to talk to but 
who are key to resolving the conflict (Fisas, 2015).  
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Lesson Learning from past peace processes 
Lesson learning has played an important role in advancing peace processes. Although no two 
conflicts are alike, there are a number of lessons and practices that authors suggest can be 
transferred from one context to another. Commentators highlight that when doing so it is 
important to understand the differences and similarities between conflicts and peace processes 
in order to draw pertinent lessons from those with similar dynamics (McGarry, 1998).  
Lessons from both successes and failures have been collected in case study reports from a 
number of country peace processes (McGarry, 1998). In turn, these efforts have been 
summarised by commentators such O’Driscoll (2017) who collated findings from Northern 
Ireland, South Africa, Sudan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, and Iraq. These case studies 
were chosen for the range of lessons they offered on a number of processes. Specifically, 
O’Driscoll distils lessons associated with three key stages of peace processes (negotiations, 
agreements and implementation) with inclusion needed at each stage. Key findings from past 
reviews on lessons from peace processes can be summarised as follows (O’Driscoll, 2017):   
 Exogenous actors are instrumental in peace processes and play a range of roles from 
facilitating negotiations, providing guarantees so that the process does not break down, 
as well as building trust between the actors.  
 Inclusive processes are more likely to succeed and lead to lasting peace; however they 
can take longer as they often require extensive preparatory negotiations and involve 
external pressure to ensure the acceptance of all parties.  
 A timeline for negotiations is important for the implementation of an agreement as this 
helps to keep all the parties on track and enables them to set a target to work towards.  
 Gender receives limited attention in most peace processes and is often left out of the 
literature, however the literature that does take a gendered-approach points to the key 
role a gender inclusive peace process can have in transforming society and highlights the 
negative impact of omitting women from peace processes (O’Reilly et al., 2015).  
 Dealing with security issues, such as police and security sector reform, is extremely 
important for power sharing arrangements, as failure to do so is likely to lead to tensions 
and the breakdown of the agreement.  
 Cabinet positions in a power sharing agreement should not be left for negotiation, 
they should be chosen through sequential proportionality rules (a mathematic equation 
based on votes won), thus preventing political impasse or breakdown of the agreement. 
 Built-in safeguards, such as transitional power sharing arrangements (involving 
negotiation parties, before elections can be held), dispute resolution mechanisms, and 
verification mechanisms help to stabilise the initial period following an agreement and 
prevent the agreement from breaking down.  
 Ex-combatants can make or break a process, it is important that they are incorporated. 
Methods to engage them once fighting has ceased must be developed.  
 Elites can be incentivised through placing cross pressures on them by making them 
more accountable to the population and the institutions within the government. 
A cross cutting theme in the literature is the importance of effective monitoring and verification as 
a means of increasing the durability of peace agreements by addressing commitment problems 
inherent in peace processes. Monitoring refers to the technical process of collecting information 
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on the basis of which a verification judgment is to be made. Verification is the process of using 
monitoring information to evaluate compliance with an agreement (Inclusive Peace and 
Transition Initiative, 2017).  
Although political elites are the ones that negotiate and reach agreements, for these to work they 
need to ‘sell’ them to their constituents. It is therefore important that grassroots or civil society 
involvement in the process. Moreover, more localised issues of conflict also need to be 
addressed, as these can often act as flares for later conflict, again making the involvement of 
stakeholders at various levels significant (Maney et al., 2006).  
More broadly, it is noted that civil society organisations must be strengthened in order to sustain 
peace processes. Grassroots peace campaigns can provide policy recommendations for elites to 
draw upon. They can also lead to elites being pressurised by the population to make 
concessions in order to achieve peace (Guelke, 2003). Additionally, civil society organisations 
give voice to groups that are often excluded from the process. When women’s rights 
organisations get involved, this may ensure a more gender sensitive process. This is important 
as women’s rights organisations often highlight human rights, interdependence, and the 
insecurity that comes with the denial of basic needs. However, it is not enough for women’s 
rights groups to merely be involved, they also need to have a say in the outcome of the 
negotiations (Maney et al., 2006; O’Reily et al., 2015).  
Finally, in order to ensure the inclusivity of peace processes, it is important to consider the 
modalities of inclusion. Paffenholz (2016: 14) identifies seven modalities for inclusion developed 
from research undertaken by the Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative1, these include: 
1. Direct representation at the negotiation table  
a. Inclusion within delegations  
b. Included actors’ own delegations  
2. Observer status for selected groups  
3. Consultations:  
a. Official / unofficial  
b. Elite / broader / public  
4. Inclusive commissions  
a. Post-agreement commissions  
b. Commissions conducting peace process  
c. Permanent bodies  
5. High-level problem-solving workshops  
6. Public decision-making (i.e. referendum)  
7. Mass action  
                                                   
1 https://www.inclusivepeace.org/  
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3. Annotated Bibliography 
Inclusive peace processes have received growing attention in the academic and policy focused 
literature and are viewed as better placed to ensure lasting stability than traditional exclusive 
peace deals negotiated solely between two or more armed groups. In a number of conflicts e.g. 
Colombia, Libya, Myanmar etc. peace processes have sought to broaden participation 
(Paffenholz, 2015). Civil society groups, political parties and women’s groups have been included 
in these negotiations and their implementation in formal roles and structures. However, authors 
such as Paffenholz (2015: 1) suggest that policy makers and international donors struggle to 
respond adequately to calls for greater inclusion. This is often associated with a lack of 
knowledge as to how inclusion can practically work in order to have a positive impact on the 
quality and sustainability of peace deals without reducing the likelihood that agreements are 
being reached. In what follows I provide an overview of literature that explores this issue, it draws 
particularly on the work of the work of centres of learning such as the Inclusive Peace and 
Transition Initiative2, Conciliation Resources3 and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue4. This 
review is not exhaustive, but rather introduces a range of readings that may serve to inform how 
international actors conceptualise, design and implement inclusive peace processes. 
The vast majority of literature emphasises that the transformative potential of inclusive processes 
can only be realised if they are genuinely inclusive of society as whole (Barnes, 2017; Blunck et 
al., 2017). Inclusivity relates to ‘process inclusivity’ (the level of societal and political 
representation) in the preparatory and actual dialogue phases; and to ‘outcome inclusivity’ (the 
level of inclusiveness created by process outputs) in the implementation phase (Planta et al., 
2015). The degree of inclusiveness, and extent to which different political actors and segments of 
society are included, shapes significantly whether stakeholders view the process as a valid way 
in which to address their grievances and aspirations (Blunck et al., 2017; CEG, 2017). 
There is a growing interest in and recognition of the importance of including women, young 
people and minorities in inclusive transition processes, which has resulted in more 
representatives of such groups appointed to delegations and the incorporation of their views and 
needs into the agenda (Blunck et al., 2017; Kaplan and Freeman, 2015). Strong ties to key 
political and religious groups, civil society actors and state institutions outside the formal 
processes must also be maintained (Kaplan and Freeman, 2015). Discussing national dialogues 
Blunck et al. (2017) comment that in Yemen, women and youth were effectively included in the 
process through a quota system; whereas Jordan did not establish a mechanism for including 
women or young people adequately, which discredited the overall process. It is important to note 
that young people and women may, however, feel firmly bound by party, tribal or ethnic lines etc. 
As such, it may be beneficial to include representatives of civil society organisations that work 
specifically on youth and women’s issues (Blunck et al., 2017).  
Even if the difficult task of including a broad range of different constituencies is accomplished, 
those who finally participate may not necessarily be representative of the group they have been 
selected for, as there are vast differences among groups, labelled as “women” or “youth”. This 
                                                   
2 https://www.inclusivepeace.org/  
3 http://www.c-r.org/  
4 https://www.hdcentre.org/  
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can, in turn, result in the exclusion of marginalised members of social groups (Planta et al., 
2015). In order to counter this difficulty, some processes have tried to adopt participative 
methodologies of self-selection with clear-cut rules of eligibility for group members to ensure 
vertical inclusivity (Papagianni, 2014). 
Inclusivity is important in all of the phases: preparatory, process/negotiation, and implementation 
(Barnes, 2017; Blunck et al., 2017). If an inclusive approach is not followed in the preparatory 
phase and in the composition of the preparatory body, the legitimacy of the process and a sense 
of ownership could be undermined from the outset (Blunck et al., 2017). The composition of 
delegates, their form of participation and the design of the decision-making process, decided in 
preparatory phases, are all essential to the level of inclusivity (Planta et al., 2015). The degree of 
inclusiveness affects whether stakeholders accept decisions that are made during the process 
(Blunck et al., 2017; CEG, 2017). 
A number of cross-cutting challenges impact on inclusionary processes. These include: 
 Balance of power issues: Efforts to include different groups will not necessarily create 
an environment conducive to successful process, as persistent imbalances of power in 
the community often persist, with certain actors having overarching control (Elayah et al., 
2018). As such, the transformative potential of inclusionary processes may only be 
realised if they help to balance power asymmetries, enabling collective engagement and 
the generation of mutually agreed outcomes (Barnes, 2017). 
 Fair representation: It is important to distinguish between diversity (the presence of a 
variety of parties) and actual inclusiveness, whereby parties are allocated actual weight 
in decision-making (Harlander, 2016). The inclusion of women, young people and 
marginalised communities, for example, needs to extend beyond mere presence to 
enabling them to voice their concerns, engage in decision making, and influence the 
process. The absence of such meaningful participation can lead to frustration and 
dissatisfaction (Blunck et al., 2017). 
 Boycotting: Despite efforts to promote inclusion, if an important group decides to boycott 
the process, the process will lose its legitimacy (Harlander, 2016). 
Methodological approaches 
Paffenholz, T. (2016). Methodologies in Peacebuilding Evaluations: Challenges and 
Testing New Approaches. Evaluation Connections. 
https://www.inclusivepeace.org/sites/default/files/EES-Paffenholz-Methodologies-
%20Peacebuilding.pdf  
In this short article, the author discusses a methodological approach to the evaluation of 
peacebuilding effectiveness. This approach entails drawing upon evidence-based comparative 
research on what worked and what did not work in similar peacebuilding interventions in order to 
analyse outcome plausibility.  
Step 1 Reconstructing theories of change: In many peacebuilding evaluations, baselines and 
theories of change that provide the rationale for how and why peacebuilding projects are 
assumed to have an impact, are implicit rather than explicit. It is common that the theories listed 
in project documents no longer reflect the intervention logic due to changes in project design or 
context. In such cases, the theory of change has to be reconstructed as part of an evaluation. 
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Step 2 Assessing theories of change: Evaluating the logical plausibility of a theory of change 
involves relating a project’s activities and outcomes to its desired impacts or goals in order to 
establish whether such impacts might reasonably be achieved. The evaluator can also assess 
whether a theory of change is relevant in a given context. Firstly, this can be done by analysing 
the causes and dynamics of conflicts over time, and secondly, by evaluating if the theory of 
change addresses these factors in a logical sequence in order to facilitate peacebuilding. 
Step 3 Assessing outcome plausibility: In the absence of detailed baseline data, an innovative 
way of assessing peacebuilding outcomes is analysing outcome plausibility by comparing the 
theory of change and the main activities conducted with existing comparative data on what has 
worked and what has not worked in similar peacebuilding interventions. However, such 
assessments are only possible if sound evidence from research or other evaluations exists.   
More specifically, the research results showed that the following reasons limited the 
effectiveness of most projects: 
 Radicalisation within society hinders this type of peace work;  
 The main focus of most initiatives is on the main conflict lines only;  
 Most initiatives are of a scattered, short term and fragmented nature;  
 Most participants are English-speaking, elite-based representatives who are often 
already “converted” to the idea of positive images of the other group;  
 People-to-people programmes do not reach society at large as they only focus on the 
individual level;  
 The apolitical nature of most initiatives frame a deeply political problem as a relationship 
problem, something that can often be misleading, and result in limited acceptance and 
ownership within society;  
 Many initiatives aim at changing attitudes, yet, this seems ineffective. Existing evidence 
from Bosnia, Cyprus and Israel/Palestine demonstrate that attitude change might not be 
necessary for behavioural change. Instead, work-related activities, which brought people 
from different groups together, proved to be more successful than peace related work. 
Here people expressed positive experiences from working with the other group, often 
producing concrete outcomes or common work initiatives. 
Reviews of peace processes 
Paffenholz, T. (2015). Can Inclusive Peace Processes Work? New Evidence from a Multi-
Year Research Project. Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative. 
https://www.inclusivepeace.org/sites/default/files/IPTI-CCDP-Can-Inclusive-Processes-
Work.pdf  
This policy brief is based on results from the multi-year research (2011-2015) on “Broadening 
Participation in Political Negotiations and Implementation” conducted at the Graduate Institute of 
International and Development Studies’ Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding. The 
results of this research form part of the knowledge base of the new Inclusive Peace and 
Transitions Initiative at the Graduate Institute, where they are used to inform policy and practice. 
7. Quality counts, not just quantity: When included actors were able to influence the 
quality of agreements (defined as addressing the causes of conflict), and/or the 
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implementation of these issues, the rate of peace agreements being reached and 
implemented was higher. When women’s groups had an influential role in a process, the 
positive impact was stronger. This shows that what matters is not merely the quantity of 
actors included, but the quality and influence of their contributions. For example, the 
Constituent Assembly in Nepal was the most representative body of its kind in Asia in 
terms of gender, cast and minority representation. However, established parties 
dominated decision-making and hindered included actors asserting influence. 
8. Broader inclusion does not weaken peace negotiations: Contrary to assumptions 
made by many mediators, broader inclusion does not reduce the likelihood of reaching 
agreements. Only in one case was an agreement not reached when a high number of 
included actors had significant influence on the process. 
9. The push for broader inclusion is mostly motivated by realpolitik, rather than by 
normative considerations: Conflict parties and mediators push for broader inclusion to 
gain legitimacy, public buy-in, or include hardliner constituencies. However, this was 
different when it came to the inclusion of women. There, inclusion was only made 
possible due to concerted effort by women themselves and their international supporters. 
10. Inclusion occurs in different modalities, both at the table and beyond: Inclusion 
takes place through different modalities at the table but also prior to and in parallel to 
official negotiations, and during implementation. While seven inclusion modalities have 
been identified, success cases featured a combination of different inclusion modalities. 
11. Implementation is key but neglected: Most attention of the international community 
goes into the negotiation phase. However, many processes fail or substantial gains of 
inclusive negotiations are lost during implementation. Inclusive post-agreement 
commissions such as monitoring bodies and constitution review commissions shape 
implementation of agreements, thus their inclusive composition and proper functioning 
needs preparation and monitoring. 
12. Process design is crucial: How inclusive peace processes are designed is fundamental 
as it enables or constrains the ability of included actors to exercise influence. Whatever 
the inclusion modality, rules and procedures can negate the benefits of inclusion. For 
example, in almost all national dialogues, despite apparent broad participation, ultimate 
decision making power rests with small groups of powerful actors.  
 In the 2001 Somali peace process, women were allocated a quota in all six 
“reconciliation” committees, but decisions by the committees required the 
authorisation of a leadership committee of clan elders.  
 The African Union-led 2008 negotiations in Kenya shows that consultations can 
be influential: three consultative civil society forums, one only for women, 
managed to get most of their demands into the peace agreements by applying a 
joint strategy of handing over short, concise recommendation papers, engaging 
with mediators and negotiators, but also issuing public statements and lobbying 
the international community.  
 Furthermore, civil society groups can increase their influence if they manage to 
overcome their divisions through coalition building and joint positioning. 
 In Yemen, although women benefitted from a 30% quota in the national dialogue, 
they did not form a unified group and rarely voted as a block, thus failing to pass 
many of the issues of concern to them. The role of the mediators has also been 
important. When mediators were inclusion-friendly and knew how to manage 
inclusion strategically, this has helped groups to assert influence. 
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 Quotas and transparent selection criteria and procedures have proven useful. 
However, there has been a tendency to often invite only “like-minded” groups, 
often civil society groups close to the parties, or else, peace-oriented change 
actors. In both cases, important actors can be excluded with crucial 
consequences for the process. The National Assembly in Guatemala has been a 
highly representative body. However, one of the most influential civil society 
organisations, the landowners association, was excluded. Together with the 
political establishment they were able to lobby against the implementation of the 
peace agreement. 
 The individuals designated to represent included groups need to be perceived as 
representative and legitimate. In Burundi, the Hutu negotiators rejected the 
participation of women’s groups not because they were women, but because 
many of them were perceived as representing only the Tutsi community. 
 Preparedness and support structures prior to, during and after negotiations can 
enhance the influence of civil society and other groups. Support can take the 
form of meeting space, Internet access, preparatory workshops and training, or 
expert support to draft position papers and understand legal subtleties. 
13. Power matters: Inclusive processes challenge established power structures, and 
resistance by powerful elites is to be expected. However, local civil society groups and 
the international community have been ill prepared to handle elite resistance. Public buy-
in for an agreement or constitution is also important and is influenced by the country’s 
political climate and the attitude of powerful actors. However, public buy-in can also be 
created. In Northern Ireland, in the run up to the referendum over the Good Friday Peace 
Agreement, a civil society campaign managed to push for a positive outcome. Regional 
powers also matter. Developments in Yemen are an example of how the lack of buy-in by 
major elites and regional actors can undermine an inclusive process. 
The findings presented above led to the development of the following recommendations for 
mediators, donors, civil society organisations and their partners:  
1. Support and lobby for a good mix of inclusion modalities at the negotiation table and 
beyond in all phases of the process.  
2. Ensure that included actors can exercise influence by providing support and expertise to 
societal and political actors beyond the main parties and helping design adequate 
processes.  
3. Apply coherent strategies that combine support and empowerment measures with 
support to the peace process such as action to reduce violence and elite resistance, 
strengthen public buy-in and regional actors’ commitments.  
4. Strengthen inclusion-awareness among mediators and teams as well as conflict parties.  
5. Improve monitoring mechanisms during implementation of agreements. 
Rausch, C. & Luu, T. (2017). Inclusive Peace Processes Are Key to Ending Violent 
Conflict. United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-
05/pb222-inclusive-peace-processes-are-key-to-ending-violent-conflict.pdf 
This brief questions what constitutes inclusive participation, and how can peacemakers and 
peacebuilders achieve it in their own, very different societies? The authors conclude.  
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 Conflict in divided societies is complex and has no single solution. Peace processes are 
vital tools but cannot on their own achieve sustainable peace. The international 
community should not only help develop an agreement and shape a process but also 
grapple with longer-term challenges of building national identity, transforming entrenched 
systems, and improving poor governance.  
 A variety of definitional and structural knowledge gaps remain around the process of 
inclusive participation. What do we mean, beyond formal negotiations, by the term peace 
processes? How do we weave together levels and strands of peacebuilding activity? How 
can we deal with dilemmas in the politics of inclusion (such as when the inclusion of one 
group creates a backlash or brings a process to a halt)? What mechanisms have been 
used, and how effective have they been?  
 Addressing these knowledge gaps using a multidisciplinary approach will help develop 
innovative tools and good practices for practitioners and policymakers working on the 
design and implementation of inclusive peace processes. 
Paffenholz, T. et al. (2017). Preventing Violence through Inclusion: From Building Political 
Momentum to Sustaining Peace. Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative. 
https://www.inclusivepeace.org/sites/default/files/IPTI-Report-Preventing-Violence-
through-Inclusion.pdf  
This study analyses when, how, and under what conditions the inclusion of a broad range of 
actors in peace and political transition processes contributes to the prevention of violence and 
armed conflict. 
Overall, the authors found that inclusion plays an important role in preventing violence. 
Importantly, how inclusion contributes to prevention depends on the kind of violence and 
relatedly, the nature of political processes. The authors also found that the causal processes that 
prevent or reduce violence differ at the early stages of the prevention attempt and during the 
transitional processes that follow, as well as according to conflict type. The findings suggest that 
a combination of different inclusion modalities is important for sustaining peace, thus indicating 
the merit of sequenced inclusion. 
In cases characterised by popular protests and incipient violent conflict, inclusion contributes to 
prevention by creating political momentum through which violence can be averted or reduced. 
When governments responded to protest-related violence through inclusive negotiation formats 
to jointly discuss the country’s future, grievances voiced on the street were transferred into formal 
processes.  
During armed conflicts, violence can initially be reduced through broadly inclusive negotiations, 
and in some instances relatively exclusive but representative elite deals. However, an early-
stage reduction of violence did not guarantee sustainable peace in the longer term. For 
maintaining reduced levels of violence, the inclusion of actors beyond the principle conflict 
parties plays a critical supportive role. 
Inclusion is viewed to contribute to peaceful transition processes in two main ways, depending on 
their design and mandate. Firstly, through Inclusive Commissions mandated to monitor or 
address violence. Secondly, through formalised bodies that address the causes of violence by 
implementing comprehensive political reform processes. Inclusion mattered most when the 
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implementing bodies addressed grievances (e.g. political or economic inequality), thus aiming to 
resolve violence by building inclusive institutions. 
Importantly, the study found little evidence that inclusion in and of itself helps to tackle violence. 
Rather, the representativeness and independence of included actors influence the degree to 
which inclusive bodies can prevent and reduce violence. If all stakeholders in a conflict are 
represented, causes of conflict are more likely to be addressed and levels of violence reduced in 
a sustainable manner. The independence of included actors from the main conflict parties also 
affects whether the modalities function smoothly and contribute to successful prevention. 
Conciliation Resources (2019). Navigating Inclusion in Peace Processes. Conciliation 
Resources. https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/Navigating_inclusion_in_peace_processes_Accord_Issue_28.pdf  
In addressing some of the practical challenges of navigating inclusion in peace processes, this 
publication is structured around three areas of enquiry:  
1. Frameworks for understanding inclusion in peace processes  
2. Inclusion in practice in national peace processes – with ‘deep dive’ case studies of 
Colombia and Nepal  
3. Inclusion in practice in sub- and supra-national peace processes – with case studies on 
Turkey, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria and Afghanistan 
The publication concludes with a summary of insights. It is structured in response to three 
dimensions of the enquiry into inclusion in peace processes: Who needs to be represented? 
How are meaningful mechanisms for inclusion best designed? What kind of more 
inclusive outcomes can result? 
Who needs to be represented? 
Addressing diversity: Identity groups affected by conflict are complex and diverse, and rarely 
have agreed national representation to speak for them with ‘one voice’. In practice, their ability to 
influence a national negotiation process is complicated by their own internal dynamics, which can 
include clashing interests and accounts of the conflict, and tactics of violence or nonviolence. 
The question of ‘whose voice counts?’ is related to perceptions of ‘whose voice is legitimate?’ 
For external actors, in making sense of whether a group has local legitimacy it is important to 
factor in their reliance on international support and whether this might substitute for a genuine 
domestic constituency.  
The challenge of ‘whole-of-system’ peace processes: Today’s conflicts tend to spill across 
multiple levels with complex local, national and international disputes ‘nested’ within each other. 
Understanding how to contribute to multi-level, ‘whole-of-system’ peace processes while working 
to common objectives is a critical and elusive challenge for any peacebuilding intervention.  
Undermining peacebuilding: External governmental involvement can underpin or undermine 
societal inclusion. Multiple and sustained peacebuilding efforts to respect the basic rule of law 
are often compromised by realpolitik international calculus, which results in varying degrees of 
state tolerance for corrupt practices and legitimisation of flawed electoral processes.  
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Women’s leadership: It is no accident that the wider ‘inclusion project’ rides on the leadership, 
struggle and gains of the global women’s movement for equal rights and participation. Examples 
cited in this publication and in research from the Political Settlements Research Programme 
show how women have created multiple spaces for promoting gender equality and meaningful 
forms of participation – from pre-talks, through negotiations, to implementation and beyond.  
Extreme exclusion of indigenous and minority communities: Elite members of society, even 
in the most violent armed conflicts, still enjoy a high degree of personal security, largely 
cocooned from the traumas of war. Indigenous and minority communities often have the opposite 
experience. In the many contexts studied here, they are disproportionately affected by armed 
conflicts and disproportionately under-represented in peace processes.  
Youth momentum: Factoring a deeper understanding of how young people can mobilise in 
peace processes includes paying attention to the particular needs for constantly refreshing youth 
leadership, who will have to deal with all the unfinished, difficult and deferred issues in the 
political settlement.  
Diaspora justice: There are multiple innovative examples of how diaspora communities can be 
part of a peace process. They face the dual challenge of seeking inclusion in host societies as 
well as in countries of origin. Ending the cycles of violence and reprisals requires that the rights 
of diaspora and of all victims’ and survivors’ and are brought to the centre of the peace process.  
How are meaningful mechanisms for inclusion best designed? 
Moving beyond the policy soundbite: As long as inclusion policies remain ambiguous and 
without clear commitments to meaningful mechanisms for participation, they will be mantras that 
can ‘hurt more than help’. Different actors view inclusion differently. Aid actors see it as 
instrumental to achieving long-term development outcomes. Security actors see it as part of a 
strategy for countering armed violence. Diplomats and peacebuilders understand it as a 
requirement for a robust peace process to address root causes of violence. Human rights 
promoters understand it as a basic right. The tensions between these different ‘inclusion projects’ 
cannot be eliminated but must be better managed.  
There are risks and consequences of ignoring the complex ways in which exclusion and 
violence affect different identity groups, preventing some from influencing political decision-
making, while ensuring others continue to shape it. Approaches that fail to pay attention to these 
dynamics risk preserving hierarchical, patriarchal and authoritarian decision-making systems with 
obvious costs for peace, justice and development. It is important to look beyond simple conflict 
narratives about the stakeholders, to uncover the multi-faceted conflicts that hide behind them.  
Preparing for participation: Political cultures of governance in contexts of protracted conflict 
tend to rely on top-down decision-making and ambivalent forms of consultation built around weak 
and often traumatised bureaucracies. So, while they may rhetorically encourage it, governance 
habits of participation in conflict contexts are poorly developed to deliver.  
Moments of rapid change: Sustained efforts towards greater inclusion shift social norms over 
time – like those relating to gender inclusion. These processes of ‘normalisation’ will not 
necessarily show direct signs of steady progress. Preparing for future transitions enables groups 
to better take advantage of such opportunities to exert long-term influence.  
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Facing forwards: There tends to be a rush to resolve conflict. But the PA-X Peace Agreements 
Database has revealed tremendous innovation in ways of leaving a process open to options for 
dispute resolution and future inclusive change. It is important to understand better how to 
navigate the fluid ‘unsettlement’ after a peace accord has been reached. References to 
international legal frameworks in peace accords can provide ‘hooks’ to leverage change if 
applied in a smart way by local actors when new opportunities arise.  
Effective peace processes do not run themselves but require professional management 
support – including impartial monitoring mechanisms and other necessary infrastructures to 
conduct the process. These infrastructures are one arena where inclusive practices can be both 
enabled and embedded.  
Sequencing in the initial stages of peace making is a key consideration. Actors should not 
undervalue the multiplicity of preparatory efforts taking place in different domains. In all 
processes, talks on a cessation of violence are preceded by often unofficial initiatives. The case 
studies in this issue suggest that comprehensive inclusiveness of belligerents in the early stages 
of a process is difficult to get right but essential to address.  
Risks in tackling the challenges of ‘belligerent inclusion’: Poorly managed power-sharing 
arrangements have incentivised coercion and unleashed violent cycles of competition for power, 
positions and resources between and within armed factions. Power-sharing arrangements need 
to pay attention to whether and how they can be implemented in ways that avoid further 
fragmentation and find tactics for supporting the political transformation of armed groups and 
their constituencies. 
Not all good things go together: Many of the case studies confirm that more directly 
representative forms of public participation such as national dialogues or referenda do not 
necessarily translate into influence over the content of an agreement. Also, elections, while an 
obvious, if limited, form of public participation, challenge the creation of conditions that enable 
consensus, compromise and reconciliation. This is equally true of referenda. In contemporary 
electoral democracies, party competition for political power can get in the way of promoting 
national interests, inter-group accommodation and peace.  
Selection procedures and criteria for participation as well as rules for decision-making 
can either support or limit meaningful inclusion: Structural approaches to inclusion have a 
fair chance to remain relevant if considered useful by the negotiating parties, for example youth 
or women’s advisory councils or parallel forms of informal governance such as councils of 
traditional leaders. Reservation systems in legislation and constitutions during or after peace 
processes can be effective in ensuring structural change but take time to make their impact felt. 
Quotas also tend to preferentially benefit elites among the marginalised.  
As peace processes move into the formalisation and then implementation of accords they 
require even wider participation. It is important to publicise the contents of the peace 
agreements through public education, translation and dissemination. Yet, the terrain for 
participation rarely has sufficient preparation. There is also the need for capacity building 
because of the entry into formal politics of people with little experience in governance and 
administration. Post-accord implementation invariably introduces new negotiations, actors and 
constituencies as those previously excluded during elite negotiations now press for meaningful 
participation in the new governance arrangements.  
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There is a direct connection between civil society inclusion and human rights protections 
which safeguard physical wellbeing. They also secure the enabling environment for 
peacebuilding work – including through peaceful protest and dissent.  
What kind of more inclusive outcomes can result? 
The promise of change: Transition processes from violence to meaningful peace are long and 
complex. Unresolved and sometimes new conflicts emerge. Corruption cultures and practices 
and weak institutions tend to persevere, while divided communities, resistance to change and 
mistrust permeate the implementation environment.  
Self-reinforcing peace outcomes: Peace dividends from one aspect of the inclusion project can 
lead to unexpected dividends in others. Research in Northern Ireland showed that when 
agreements were reached on progressive programmes of police reform and disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration, they also addressed some of the causes and enabling factors 
of violence against women.  
Civil society inclusion is no substitute for a flawed process: Inclusion of civil society actors 
can bolster claims that a political process is legitimate. Their information and perspectives can be 
so valued that consulting with them in an official process may be deemed to be a political 
necessity. But their inclusion in a stalled process risks sending an impression of progress where 
there is none, and may mask fundamental challenges instead of addressing them. 
The consequences of not implementing commitments: Certain peace agreement provisions 
are particularly resistant to implementation and will require new strategies and diligence. 
Commitments on accountability for harm or crimes committed related to the conflict are clearly 
the most fiercely resisted, as those responsible for implementing them also tend to be the most 
liable. Economic reforms and ethnic, gender and environmental commitments have lower 
implementation rates than those related to disarmament or power-sharing. Failed implementation 
in one area has knock-on effects that compound the complexities of implementation in others 
and risk enabling future conflict. 
The need to find new ways to be more relevant and effective: Traditional modes of ‘settling’ 
conflicts are failing. Complex local, national and global political marketplaces that are siloed by 
sector mean that there is a pressing need to reach new ways of working that could unlock 
synergies across the development, humanitarian, security, justice, peacebuilding and diplomatic 
arenas. Future peace programming design needs to experiment with ways of moving more 
nimbly between multiple levels, and to develop better strategies for addressing parallel and 
competing processes and dynamics. A common commitment to inclusion is one area where we 
could see a strategic alignment of principles for separate but articulated interventions. 
Inclusion of Civil society 
Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative (2017). Civil Society’s Role in Monitoring and 
Verifying Peace Agreements: Seven Lessons from International Experiences. Inclusive 
Peace and Transition Initiative. https://www.inclusivepeace.org/sites/default/files/Civil-
Society-Monitoring-Peace-Agreements.pdf  
The objective of this report is to summarise the available evidence about civil society’s role in 
monitoring and verification activities. Based on experiences from different peace processes, this 
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report’s aim is threefold; it provides an introduction to the purpose of monitoring and verification 
of peace agreements, it presents the different modalities of how civil society has participated in 
the monitoring and verification of peace agreements and it analyses opportunities and 
challenges, and presents seven lessons for civil society’s effective contribution to monitoring and 
verification of peace agreements. The report concludes that: 
1. Civil society participation in monitoring and verification is more effective when provided 
with political, technical and financial support.  
2. Partisan political influence undermines the legitimacy of civil society and increases the 
risks faced by civil society actors.  
3. Non-specific provisions for civil society inclusion in monitoring are unlikely to be 
implemented.  
4. The inclusion of civil society in monitoring and verification is most effective when it 
reflects the capacities and context of civil society organisations.  
5. Integrated monitoring is more effective than monitoring which is fragmented across many 
organisations.  
6. Civil society organisations are more effective when they combine monitoring and 
mediation activities.  
7. Civil society organisations engaged in monitoring and verification struggle to influence 
compliance without international or national support 
Idris, I. (2019). Support for civil society engagement in peace processes. K4D Helpdesk 
Report 604. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. https://gsdrc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/12/604_Support_for_Civil_Society_Engagement_in_Peace_Process
es.pdf 
This rapid literature review synthesises findings on support for civil society engagement in peace 
processes. The report states that there is widespread acknowledgement of the importance of civil 
society engagement in peace processes. This is reflected in the wide range of interventions 
implemented by various donors to support such engagement. This review looks at the 
effectiveness of interventions specifically aimed at supporting civil society groups to participate in 
peace processes. The author identifies, a number of challenges in identifying evidence. Donor 
support for civil society in peacebuilding situations can take many different forms (e.g. promoting 
social cohesion, reconciliation, community-level mediation, and so on); interventions targeting 
civil society are often a component of a broader project or programme; finally, there is a dearth of 
evaluations of such interventions. These constraints make it difficult to draw definitive 
conclusions about the effectiveness of these interventions and the factors driving success. 
The review focused on three contexts: Nepal, Yemen and Libya. All have/are coming out of 
violent conflict; there is heavy international involvement and support for peace processes; and 
the challenge in all is to bring about sustained peace. Because no intervention was found 
explicitly referring to donor support for civil society participation in peace processes, the review 
takes a broader perspective and looks at donor interventions targeting civil society and aimed at 
peacebuilding in those contexts. Key findings of the review are as follows:  
 Nepal: A number of donor countries have supported interventions targeting civil society 
in the context of the Nepal peace process. Interventions were largely found to have been 
effective in promoting an inclusive peace. A number of success factors could be identified 
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across the evaluations reviewed: ability to pick the right partners for on-the-ground 
implementation; a high degree of gender sensitivity; building relationships with local 
partners based on mutual trust and respect; allowing time for results to be seen; ensuring 
participatory, bottom-up planning; and taking a multi-pronged approach.  
 Yemen: A number of the interventions identified in Yemen are still ongoing, and no 
evaluations were found. The Enhancing Women’s Roles in Peace and Security in Yemen 
project was carried out by Saferworld in partnership with Yemeni organisations. An 
evaluation report noted that women-led initiatives need institutional support and direct 
financial support.  
 Libya: A Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) country programme includes the 
promotion of women’s economic empowerment through political participation and support 
for civil society. No evaluation report was found for the programme. 
As noted above, given the constraints, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions. This review 
perhaps most clearly points to the need for more evaluations of donor interventions to support 
civil society, and specifically to support civil society participation in peace processes.  
Gender 
Bell, C. (2018). Accessing Political Power: Women and Political Power-Sharing in Peace 
Processes. UN-Women https://www.unwomen.org/-
/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2018/inclusive-peace-
processes-accessing-political-power-en.pdf?la=en&vs=1128  
This brief is part of a Gender Briefing Series to support women’s meaningful participation and the 
integration of gender perspectives in peace processes that aim to end violent intrastate conflict. 
This Brief is an output of the Political Settlements Research Programme. Using a comparative 
approach, the briefs:  
 Establish the importance of the issue from a gender equality perspective and the 
importance of women’s meaningful engagement for effectively addressing it.  
 Identify key issues with reference to the inclusion of women and their gender-related and 
gender-specific dimensions.  
 Suggest ways of influencing change in peace processes, including identifying possible 
entry points and overcoming tensions with competing strategies.  
 Highlight through examples how integrating gender perspectives in peace agreements 
not only benefits women, but also helps diversify perspectives and proposed solutions, 
thereby contributing more generally to progress in peace processes for all.  
 Provide quantitative and qualitative data from peace agreements, using examples from 
across the world as evidence and inspiration for action.  
 Offer analysis that provides for principled approaches to inclusion – grounded in 
international legal standards – with an indication of how these can be linked to pragmatic 
political arguments. 
The brief identifies the following activities as useful in engaging with power-sharing proposals to 
make them more inclusive of women and agendas for equality. 
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1. Producing strong gender-responsive conflict analysis of group power dynamics 
and incentives. There will be a number of predictable ways in which the parties to 
conflict may achieve a compromise between what are often irreconcilable demands to 
‘own’ the state. Any compromise will revolve around new permutations of political, 
territorial, military and economic power.  
2. Modelling power-sharing proposals for their possible gender impact. Women can 
anticipate and scenario-plan for how the possible power-sharing models proposed may 
affect them, for example, by considering how the power-allocation formulae are likely to 
affect women’s participation in practice, given other group balances. They might also 
consider how to frame proposals in ways that make them more likely to be heard by 
mediators and others not disposed to gender equality.  
3. Building alliances between and across women’s groups. Different groups of women 
may choose different means of influencing the process – for example, from inside 
particular political groupings, working across groupings, building very local 
constituencies, working with international actors. It is important to have frequent dialogue 
and consultation across diverse groups of women, including across what may be several 
women’s movements rather than a singular women’s movement, to try to build strong 
communication and transparency, tolerance and dialogue as part and parcel of creating 
different strategies in a multi-layered cross-constituency approach to peacebuilding.  
4. Building alliances with other groups. Women will have alliances with political-military 
groupings, or alliances with other non-aligned minorities whose challenges of exclusion 
they may share. Often, broad ‘rainbow’ coalitions pushing for equality can be more 
successful in creating a broader form of political power-sharing with better protection for 
human rights. Moreover, tactical use of the diversity of women and others advocating for 
equality may resonate with different parties, helping to move fixed party positions.  
5. Formulating clear proposals for women’s inclusion, which have evidence of cross- 
sector support from other marginalised constituencies. Women will need to 
determine whether and how they want to seek direct representation in political power-
sharing governance arrangements. Lobbying will need to address how women are to be 
selected, who will select them, and what type of representative role they will be 
understood to play. Challenging questions will require significant discussion amongst 
women, and a level of compromise between different feminist and women’s positions.  
6. Pushing for representation in the structures set up to advance the transitional 
deliberation. Women will often want to seek strong representation in national dialogues, 
constitution-making or reform processes, and peace agreement implementation 
mechanisms. Thinking about how women’s interests can be achieved is important/ 
7. Asking for support and advice. Challenging levels of detail can be approached with the 
help of technical advice on how such proposals are likely to affect women in any given 
context. Gender equality advocates and gender advisors, and indeed mediators and 
parties to conflict, should seek specific advice on how the detail of power-sharing 
arrangements is likely to affect the representation of women within the particular electoral 
and power-balances of a country. 
Paffenholz, T. et al. (2016). Making Women Count - Not Just Counting Women: Assessing 
Women’s Inclusion and Influence on Peace Negotiations. Inclusive Peace and Transition 
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Initiative. https://www.inclusivepeace.org/sites/default/files/IPTI-UN-Women-Report-
Making-Women-Count-60-Pages.pdf  
The objective of this report is to present an analysis of women’s inclusion distilled from the larger 
“Broadening Participation” research project, in order to provide direct comparative evidence on 
women’s influence in previous cases of peace processes. The research found that the direct 
inclusion of women does not per se increase the likelihood that more peace agreements are 
signed and implemented. What makes a difference is the influence women have on a process. 
Key findings are highlighted below: 
 Women have made substantial contributions to peace-making and constitution-making 
negotiations and to the implementation of final agreements even if their inclusion is still 
challenged or met with indifference by many negotiation parties and mediators. 
 The strength of women’s influence is positively correlated with agreements being 
reached and implemented. In cases where women’s groups were able to exercise strong 
influence on a negotiation process, the chances of a final agreement being reached were 
much higher than in those cases where women’s influence was moderate, weak, or 
absent in practice. The chances of peace agreements being implemented were also 
much higher when women’s groups had a stronger influence on the process. 
 The involvement of women does not weaken peace processes. On the contrary, the 
presence of women strengthened the influence other additionally included actors had on 
the peace processes studied. This is because organised women’s groups pressured for 
signing peace deals more often than any other group participating in a peace process.  
 Women’s inclusion is not limited to direct participation at the negotiation table. Women’s 
inclusion has occurred in the past through multiple modalities and throughout the 
different peace process phases (i.e. pre-negotiation, negotiation, and post-agreement 
implementation). In any peace process, several modalities of inclusion may be present 
either separately or, more often, in parallel to each other during all process phases.  
 A specific set of process and context factors work hand in hand to either enable or 
constrain women’s ability to participate and exercise influence: Selection criteria and 
procedures; Decision-making procedures; Coalition-building; Transfer strategies; 
Inclusion-friendly mediators; Early inclusion in the peace process; Support structures; 
Monitoring; Funding. 
UN Women (2018). Women’s Meaningful Participation in Negotiating Peace and the 
Implementation of Peace Agreements: Report of the Expert Group Meeting. 
https://iknowpolitics.org/sites/default/files/egm-womens-meaningful-participation-in-
negotiating-peace-en_0.pdf  
Participants in this expert group meeting discussed the barriers to and enablers of women’s 
representation and meaningful participation at all stages of peace and security processes. The 
scope of the discussions reflected the reality of contemporary peace and security processes and 
included discussion of ceasefires, informal and local/community level peacebuilding processes, 
negotiations and formal peace agreements, implementation mechanisms, transitional or 
constitutional arrangements, disarmament and demobilization arrangements, humanitarian 
access agreements, the growing focus on counter-terrorism operations and more. The report 
highlighted the need to: 
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 Harness political will and eliminate structural blockages;  
 Embed gender-sensitive conflict analysis as standard practice;  
 Strengthen long-term support, enabling measures, and transformative approaches;  
 Support national and local ownership;  
 Secure gender-sensitive agreements and implementation. 
Mediation Guidelines 
Harlander, J. (2016). Supporting a national dialogue Dilemmas & options for third parties. 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/Harlander_MPS_Supporting-a-National-Dialogue-1.pdf 
The Mediation Practice Series was initiated in 2008 as part of the Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue’s efforts to support the broader mediation community. This Mediation Practice Series 
paper seeks to provide concrete examples in order to identify key factors of success for a 
national dialogue and prepare third parties for the challenges that they might face in supporting 
such processes. Essential points for practitioners include: 
 There is no blueprint for national dialogues. Based on lessons learned, third parties can, 
however, identify factors contributing to their success and failure, as well as recurrent 
challenges for such processes.  
 National dialogues are designed to conduct inclusive consultations to forge consensus, 
negotiate reforms or determine the process through which reforms will take place, and/or 
start a reconciliation process.  
 Factors for success include the quality of a national dialogue’s mandate, the political will 
of parties for change, and the inclusiveness of the process.  
 National dialogues should avoid being perceived as ivory towers by constituencies and 
gain from links to parallel dialogue tracks and existing political processes and institutions.  
 To preserve the legitimacy of the process, third parties’ support to national dialogues 
should not replace or overshadow national ownership.  
 National dialogues do not guarantee that reforms or transitions will be successful, and 
they alone cannot resolve all the challenges a country and society face. In addition, third 
parties should remember that the participants’ willingness and the technical quality of a 
national dialogue do not guarantee a positive outcome.  
 Third-party support is rarely disinterested and different parties might sometimes have 
opposing objectives in supporting a national dialogue.  
 Clarity should be an essential principle for the mandate of a national dialogue. A mandate 
which is too broad risks triggering intractable debates during the process to redefine the 
exact terms of the mandate. A narrow mandate on the other hand might greatly limit the 
room for change and generate frustration among participants and constituencies. 
 The selection of delegates is a highly political step in the organisation of a national 
dialogue and will influence the legitimacy and inclusivity of the process. Consultations are 
an appropriate tool to prevent tensions during the selection process.  
 Decision-making rules are important and might result in locking a dialogue in lengthy 
debates, or in vetoes or boycotts due to the frustration of some participants.  
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 The convening of a national dialogue is a major undertaking in terms of organisation. The 
venue, costs, security and administrative support play a key role in the smooth 
development of the process. 
 Outputs of national dialogues are not always tangible. Such processes are also 
socialising mechanisms for parties whose interactions have otherwise been 
characterised by mutual animosity.  
 For implementation, it is very important that follow-up mechanisms are designed and 
agreed upon by consensus. 
Paffenholz, T. (2014). Broadening participation in peace processes: Dilemmas & options 
for mediators. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 
https://www.inclusivepeace.org/sites/default/files/HD-Centre-Broadening-Participation-
Mediators.pdf  
This paper seeks to provide mediators and mediation teams with a better understanding of, and 
options for, broadening participation in peace negotiations without sacrificing the effectiveness of 
the mediation process. The author cautions that while in some cases all relevant groups can 
have a seat at the negotiation table, this might not be possible for all negotiations. Hence, the 
following nine participation options can suit different contexts. They can take place either in 
parallel or sequentially, as they are not mutually exclusive.  
Model One Direct representation at the negotiation table: In this model, all relevant groups 
are party to negotiations. This is the most direct form of participation and gives all players the 
same status as the main conflict parties. Examples are the Inter-Yemeni Dialogue that started in 
2013 or the Inter-Congolese Dialogue from 2002. In Yemen, the UN mediator pushed for an all-
inclusive dialogue as a means to allow all parties jointly to shape the future of their country in the 
process of the double transition from war to peace and from authoritarian to more democratic 
forms of governance. This process also ensures broader public buy-in and an acceptance of the 
agreement by all constituencies. 
Model Two Observer status: Instead of participating as an additional party at the negotiation 
table, groups could instead have observer status. This can be particularly effective if a group has 
a high moral standing in the country and is seen as a guarantor for the agreement. It might also 
be a means of pleasing certain constituencies. 
Model Three Official consultative forums: This model consists of formal forums comprising 
societal or political groups that are an official part of the peace process design. Such a forum has 
to be officially endorsed by all parties and the mediators, as was the case in Guatemala or 
Afghanistan in 2001. The mandate of such a forum can be specified by the mediator, the conflict 
parties, or by the groups themselves. In most cases, the consultative forum would follow the 
same agenda as the official negotiations but it mostly also adds issues to the negotiation agenda. 
It is essential that transfer modalities are agreed, i.e. how recommendations of the forum will be 
brought to the negotiation table. It is also important to agree whether the forum’s 
recommendations are binding or not. 
Model Four Consultations: Here, consultations are not an officially endorsed part of the peace 
process architecture but can also take place before, parallel to or after official negotiations. 
Nevertheless, these consultations can enable diverse voices from the population to be heard and 
can inform wider constituencies about the negotiation process. They not only allow the mediation 
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team to better understand the conflict dynamics and the critical negotiation issues, but also allow 
mediators to gain insights into people’s needs, ideas and visions and to determine which players 
should be involved in shaping the post-agreement agenda. The case of the Kenyan post-election 
violence negotiations in 2008 demonstrates that groups can have substantial impact on the 
agreement. 
Model Five Inclusive post-agreement mechanisms: Most peace agreements contain 
provisions for including wider representation into implementation mechanisms. Some peace 
agreements also include provisions for groups to inform the population about the agreement. In 
Somalia, for example, the 1993 agreement included a provision stipulating that civil society 
delegations would travel to all parts of the country to educate people about the agreement. Some 
agreements even provided seats for civil society representatives in national legislatures, as was 
the case in the Philippines in 1996, Burundi in 2000 and Liberia in 2003. 
Model Six High-level civil society initiatives: High-level initiatives can take place before or in 
parallel to the official negotiations. These may be outside supported problem-solving workshops 
or private facilitation initiatives undertaken either by well-respected civil society leaders from 
within the country (insider mediators) or by externals. Both seek to strengthen the effectiveness 
of the negotiations, provide facilitation and, depending on the case, advocate for specific issues. 
Model Seven Public participation: Such activities could include public hearings, citizen panels 
and opinion polls. Public participation serves different objectives, including to: improve 
understanding of the public’s opinions and needs, which in turn informs the negotiation agenda; 
create public buy-in and legitimacy for the peace process; put pressure on the conflict parties 
and help sustain the peace process; gather evidence from people about human rights violations 
or other grievances. 
Model Eight Public decision-making: Following an armed conflict, peace agreements and/or 
new constitutions can be ratified by the electorate. This is a powerful tool to get public buy-in into 
an elite pact. Peace agreements are frequently negotiated by the moderates within parties. A 
public decision can then help to protect the agreement from hard-liner constituencies. It also 
seeks to provide democratic legitimacy to the process, ensuring public support and the 
sustainability of the agreement. A vote in favour of the agreement gives decision-makers a 
mandate to continue the process and gives them leverage over hard-line constituencies. A vote 
against the agreement blocks its implementation and usually puts the process on hold. Hence, 
the decision to put a peace deal to public vote needs careful consideration. 
Model Nine Mass action: Most mass action centres on a common goal of national interest such 
as the end of authoritarian rule or war. Mass action can also take the form of targeted campaigns 
advocating the inclusion of relevant issues in the peace agreement. It may create a general pro- 
or anti-peace-agreement atmosphere. In Nepal in2006, for example, three months of mass 
demonstrations put pressure on the conflict parties to end the armed conflict and the 
authoritarian rule, paving the way for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. By way of contrast, 
during the 2002 peace process in Sri Lanka, demonstrations against peace negotiations and the 
Norwegian facilitation – often carried out by Buddhist monks – became more frequent and louder 
than were the demonstrations in support of the peace process. Popular support for the military 
victory over the LTTE in 2009 demonstrates the power of the pro-war movement, which the 
facilitators and the international community had underestimated. 
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